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 One of the many issues following governmental collapse and transition 
in any country is that of the former officials. The twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries have seen many governmental transitions; approaches regarding 
former officials have varied considerably, as have their outcomes. Naturally, 
pre-transitional characteristics and the characteristics of governmental collapse 
greatly affect these outcomes; however, transitional judicial action against 
former high-level officials has been successful in many transitions. Would such 
an approach be applicable in the event of Korean reunification, and how would 
it best be implemented with the objective of ending human rights violations in 
North Korea and facilitating an effective transition to South Korean leadership?
Defining Democratic Transition
 Democratic transition must take place before the pursuit of transitional 
justice can begin. Scholars have varying interpretations of what exactly 
constitutes true democratic transition. Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe 
Schmitter define such a shift as taking place in the interval between the fall of 
an authoritarian regime and the institution of some form of democracy.1 Scott 
Mainwaring expands on that definition, outlining three necessary characteristics 
of a post-authoritarian democratic government. First, competitive popular 
elections, free of manipulation, must be the primary avenue to political power. 
Second, broad adult citizenship must be recognized by the government. Finally, 
1 Scott Mainwaring, “Transitions to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation: Theoretical 
and Comparative Issues,”  Working Paper #130, Kellogg Institute for International 
Studies,  November 1989, accessed August 4, 2012, http://kellogg.nd.edu/publications/
workingpapers/ WPS/130.pdf citing Guillermo O’Donnel, Philippe Schmitter and 
Laurence Whitehead, eds. 1986. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for 
Democracy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
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the government must guarantee essential civil liberties (and human rights) to 
all citizens, as well as protect the rights of minorities.2
 O’Donnell and Schmitter differentiate between democracy and 
consolidated democracy, noting that consolidated democracy follows the 
installation of democracy in a successful transition. Mainwaring builds 
upon this assertion, contrasting “democratic governments” and “democratic 
regimes”.3 Regimes are not necessarily confined by the regulations followed 
and upheld by democratic governments. These regulations take constitutional 
form—for example, the United States constitution limits presidents to two 
terms. Leaders of democratic regimes find ways to amend such regulations, 
if they exist in his or her state to begin with, and enable themselves to stay in 
power, or widen their authority.4 Prominent examples of democratic regimes 
are the Philippines under Ferdinand Marcos and the Republic of Korea (ROK, 
or South Korea) under Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan.  In the case of 
the latter, transition from democratic regime to democratic government came 
about as a result of widespread civilian protests in favor of direct presidential 
election and an end to harboring, torture and killing of political prisoners.
Responding to Past Abuses  
 In the process of transition, or following its successful completion, a 
wide range of options are available in response to past human rights violations, 
both in substance and in execution, to those managing transition. Each has 
advantages and disadvantages, and some are more feasible than others, 
particularly in domestically-managed transitions with limited resources. Brian 
K. Grodsky condenses the transitional judicial responses to past human rights 
abuses taken by a multitude of states in his book, The Costs of Justice, into 
seven general approaches, which are as follows: cessation and codification 
of human rights violations, rebuke of the old system, rehabilitation and 
compensation for victims, creation of a truth commission, purging human 
rights abusers from public function, criminal prosecution of “executors” (those 
lower on the chain-of-command) and criminal prosecution of commanders 
(those higher on the chain-of-command). They are classified on a spectrum of 
harshness, with cessation and codification being the most lenient and criminal 
prosecution of commanders being the most harsh.5
2 Ibid.
3 Mainwaring, “Transitions to Democracy” citing O’Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe 
Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds. 1986. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: 
Prospects for Democracy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
4 Mainwaring, “Transitions to Democracy.”
5 Brian K. Grodsky, The Costs of Justice: How New Leaders Respond to Previous Rights 
Abuses (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010), 38.
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 The fifth, sixth and seventh approaches listed involve transitional justice, 
as action is taken against former leaders as part of those approaches. Large 
groups of lower-level officials, higher-level officials or both can face trial after 
transition, as was the case in Japan.  Alternatively, only certain lower- or higher-
level officials (such as those believed to have exhibited unusual cruelty in their 
duties, in the case of the former, or those directly responsible for policies which 
caused abuses, in the case of the latter) can face action. Additionally, guilty 
verdicts in transitional judicial proceedings do not necessitate sentencing—
guilty verdicts can serve to condemn and codify past violations while avoiding 
the increased risk of retribution associated with punishment of officials.6
 Grodsky writes that those identifying with the “purist” school in 
international law advocate prosecution of all former officials responsible for or 
having engaged in human rights violations.7 However, due to the sheer number 
of violators and the difficulties a new government would face bringing them all 
to trial, such an approach is virtually impossible. Additionally, past attempts 
to punish vast sums of violators have caused many problems. Therefore, 
approaches more in line with the “pragmatist” school referenced by Grodsky, 
which involve selective justice and selective amnesty, are both more feasible 
and more effective in facilitating transition.8
 For purposes of clarity, the term “selective justice” in this essay refers 
to transitional judicial action against certain former officials who engaged in 
human rights abuses, or small groups thereof, with the objectives of ending 
human rights violations, preventing future violations and ensuring successful 
democratic transition, within the boundaries of feasibility imposed by 
limited resources and legal mechanisms. Pursuit of selective justice in a post-
transitional society necessitates amnesty for many former perpetrators because 
not all of them can (or should) be tried. While formally granted amnesties 
greatly lessen the potential for resistance to transition among former officials, 
they risk public disapproval because they specifically allow violations to go 
unpunished. De facto amnesties result from lack of judicial action against 
violators. Such an approach leaves open the possibility of judicial action 
against former officials, risking their retribution, while still allowing almost 
all violators to remain unpunished.9 “Selective amnesty” refers to explicitly 
granted amnesty for former officials, with the purpose of ensuring successful 
transition and avoiding unpractical requirements of existing resources and 
legal structures.
6  Ibid., 13-57.
7 Ibid., 16.
8 Ibid., 16-17.
9  Ibid., 13-58.
 Spring 2013, Volume XXXVIII  •  56
 In any transitional judicial process, application of selective justice, and 
likewise selective amnesty, necessitates careful consideration. Action against 
“executors” is beneficial in that it curtails violations through exemplifying 
individual responsibility for abuses—police officers carrying out arbitrary 
arrests are not exempt from punishment because they were simply “carrying out 
orders.”10 Furthermore, such action often seems necessary—violent lower-level 
officials have no place in government, no matter who is in charge. Grodsky, 
however, writes that any significant legal response to abusive “executors” must 
be systematic.   
 One or two criminal prosecutions of low-level perpetrators or twenty 
investigations of a 10,000- person administrative unit—where far more people 
are known to have been involved in rights abuses—are insufficient.11
 Such systematic action may be unfeasible due to limited resources or 
qualified judicial personnel, or destabilizing to the transitional government or 
society. For purposes of clarity, judicial action against lower-level officials 
will only be classified as such if it is systematic—trial of a handful of officials 
will be considered in case study analysis, but not as “criminal prosecution of 
‘executors,’” as defined by Grodsky. 
 Judicial action can alternatively be pursued against commanders, 
those who hold responsibility for the policies or systems which permitted or 
encouraged rights violations. Such an approach is advantageous in that it seeks 
to punish those officials, or label their actions as unacceptable, deters future 
leaders from engaging in similar abuses, and further legitimizes international 
statutes on human rights. Furthermore, governments naturally have a much 
smaller number of commanders than executors, and often only one or a few 
are responsible for the mechanisms which violate the rights of their people. 
Accordingly, only one higher-level official need be tried for this approach to 
be effective. Therefore, judicial action against commanders will be classified 
as such even if legal action was taken against only one higher-level official in 
a case study.
 The pitfalls of action against commanders largely involve difficulty 
bringing them to trial, particularly if they retain considerable influence. Trial 
of higher-level officials often worries other former leaders, who may remain 
influential, and make them resistant to transition.12  Therefore, explicitly-
granted amnesty must be considered to lessen elite fear of retribution in the 
face of legal action against former leaders.
10 Ibid., 52.
11 Ibid., 87.
12 Ibid., 54.
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Legal Institutions and Selective Justice  
 International tribunals, such as those conducted by the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), often pursue selective justice with the same objectives 
as those defined above.13 Indeed, international tribunals are a prominent 
transitional judicial option as they hold oppressive leaders to international 
human rights standards in countries that are unable or unwilling to do so. 
Tribunals, however, are often inefficient and time-consuming, sometimes 
lasting for decades.  They also threaten harsher punishment for ousted leaders 
than they may face if dealt with by domestic systems, which makes those 
leaders more adverse to transition.
 In addition, debate over international law and punishments for violations, 
as well as the role of the ICC, continues, which compromises international 
support for tribunal verdicts. Many international players object to international 
tribunals on other grounds—the US’ refusal to recognize the ICC is evidence 
of such.14 Additionally, leaders of many nations are, logically, reluctant to 
support the establishment of legal precedents that could one day be applied 
to them.15 China, for example, has objected to components of Article 5 of the 
Rome Statute, which can be invoked to prosecute leaders responsible for the 
killing of nationals.16 17 
 The alternative to tribunals is domestic action, which enables leaders 
and citizens formerly affected by human rights abuses to approach transitional 
justice in a national context. Punishments dictated by domestic legal systems 
are usually more lenient than those resulting from tribunals, often involving 
broad amnesty. Therefore, support among leaders for transition is stronger 
when domestic trials are employed. Such trials are often limited, however, by 
lack of resources and unbiased judges educated in international law.18 Hybrid 
approaches, which combine international and domestic judiciaries, often have 
problems associated with both tribunals and domestic trials. This has been the 
13 Sara Darehshori and Elizabeth Evenson, “Peace, Justice and the International 
Criminal Court,” Research Article 1, Oxford Transitional Justice Research, 
March 19, 2010, accessed August 13, 2012, http://www.csls.ox.ac.uk/documents/
DarehshoriandEvenson2010.pdf.
14 “Overview of the United States Opposition to the International Criminal Court,” ICC 
Now, accessed August 13, 2012, http://www.iccnow.org/documents/CICCFS_US_
Opposition_to_ICC_11Dec06_final.pdf.
15 Bing Bing Jia, “China and the International Criminal Court: Current Situation,” 2006 
Singapore Yearbook of International Law and Contributors (2006), accessed August 13, 
2012, http://law.nus.edu.sg/sybil/downloads/
 current/Jia_SYBIL_2006.pdf.
16 Bing Bing Jia, “China and the ICC.”
17 “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,”  United Nations (1998),  accessed 
August 13, 2012, http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/romefra.htm. 
18 Priscilla Hayner, Unspeakable Truths (New York: Routledge, 2001), 12.
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case in Cambodia, where several former Khmer Rouge officials are on trial for 
human rights violations during their rule in the 1970s and ‘80s.  Many have 
died before their scheduled trials, and the effectiveness of any action by the 
tribunal has been considerably lessened due to the amount of time that has 
passed since the Khmer Rouge fell from power. Additionally, more than half 
of the presiding judicial officials are Cambodian, with ties to, or favorable 
views of, the Khmer Rouge, making justice less likely.19
Case Studies
  In order to better predict the most effective approach for Korea and the 
international community in the objectives of democratic transition and cessation 
of human rights violations north of the present De-Militarized Zone (DMZ), 
similar states, which have addressed the issue of transition and transitional 
justice in the past, require study. Examination of several cases, involving either 
societies with pre-transition characteristics similar to those of present-day North 
Korea, or societies which addressed transitional and judicial issues likely to 
be factors in North Korean transition, follows. Analysis of these studies is 
beneficial in that it highlights approaches that have brought success in past 
transitions, particularly in cases similar to North Korea. It must be noted that 
North Korea is unique, and its society has many characteristics not present in 
any other case studies. This is true for any country; due to cultural differences 
and separate historical transitional contexts, approaches taken in one case do 
not always work in others.
  In addition to a brief synopsis of the initial issues and subsequent 
transitional justice approaches taken in each case, each transition will be labeled 
successful of unsuccessful based on Mainwaring’s guidelines: in democratic 
societies, free elections will be the primary selective process for governmental 
leaders, broad citizenship will be granted and civil liberties will be protected.
South Korea
 Today a dramatic contrast to the North in almost every aspect, South 
Korea, as noted in the introduction, has a great deal in common with North 
Korea.  For centuries before their division, the two shared a common history, 
including the hardship of Japanese colonization. Their post-division histories 
are similar through 1987—until then, both struggled with poverty and autocratic 
regimes which had little, if any, respect for human rights.20 Following a 
19 Elisa Hoven, comp., “The Khmer Rouge Tribunal—Cambodia’s Search for Justice,” 
CSEAS Speaker Series, University of Hawaii (2010), http://scholarspace/manoa.hawaii.
edu/handle/10125/15288.
20 Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place In The Sun (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997).
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short-lived attempt at democratic transition in the early 1960s, South Korea 
successfully democratized in the 1980s, became a regional power and then 
rose to the world stage. Though all early South Korean presidents violated the 
rights of South Koreans, only the second transition attempt focused on holding 
these men accountable for those abuses.
 South Korea’s first president was Syngman Rhee, an authoritarian anti-
communist leader who violated human rights on several occasions, notably 
presiding over the shooting of protestors following severely rigged presidential 
elections favoring Rhee’s designee.21 A public uprising resulted from this 
atrocity, forcing him from power and giving way to a renewed democracy, led 
by prime minister Myon Chang, which vested most power with the parliament. 
In reaction to Rhee’s leadership, the new governmental structure greatly limited 
the potential for future presidential abuse of power; however, this change, 
destabilized and weakened the government.22
 More backlash against the Rhee regime followed—a series of 
governmental purges was carried out by the new leaders as a result of popular 
pressure. Forty thousand former government officials and police officers were 
investigated under suspicion of complicity in anti-democratic activities or 
corruption. Of these, more than 2,200 government officials and 4,000 police 
officers were purged.23
 These purges angered those affected and caused further political and 
social destabilization.24 The strength of the police force was greatly lessened, 
along with the effectiveness of the government. Major General Park Chung-hee, 
heading military and popular factions opposed to the weakness of the Chang 
government and fearing its collapse into communism, led a coup on May 16, 
1961.25 The police force was far from capable of protecting the government 
and keeping order. Park was able to generate incredible support for the military 
coup, even among military police officers sent to arrest those partaking in 
the coup, as a result of the perceived weakness and corruption of the Chang 
government.26 Within twenty-four hours, Park and the military leadership 
had assumed control of the entire South Korean government.27 Though Park 
initially enjoyed democratic support, he followed a trajectory similar to that 
of Syngman Rhee, evolving into a tyrannical dictator who showed no respect 
21 Cumings, Korea’s Place, 344.
22 Ibid., 346.
23 Andrew C. Nahm, Korea: Tradition & Transformation (Elizabeth: Hollym International 
Corp, 1988), 441.
24 Ibid.
25 Cumings, Korea’s Place, 347.
26 Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel, eds, The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation 
of South Korea (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 50.
27 Cumings, Korea’s Place, 348.
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for the rights of the South Korean people.
 Following decades of oppressive rule under Park Chung-hee and, later, 
Chun Doo-hwan, the South Korean populace installed the Sixth Republic by 
forcing Chun Doo-hwan to hold elections, in which Roh Tae-woo triumphed.28 
Roh was a veteran Korean politician; he had held a prominent position in the 
oppressive Chun government, which engaged in heavy censorship and often 
killed protestors.29 Roh proclaimed himself the face of a new South Korean 
democracy and blamed Chun alone for the killing of students protesting the 
anti-democratic government on December 12, 1979, though he had also been 
involved in the response.30 One senior official, Chang Se-dong, then head of 
South Korean intelligence, was sent to prison for involvement in the killing 
of protestors, but the Roh government did not punish any others.31
 Kim Yong-sam was elected president in 1993, and his government 
addressed past human rights abuses more directly. Action was taken against 
Roh and Chun; they were given lengthy prison sentences following trials and 
convictions by the democratic government and South Korean citizens. No 
lower-level officials were prosecuted. Roh and Chun were pardoned after only 
a few years in prison, but a human rights precedent had been established.32
 The purge enacted by the Chang government in response to human rights 
violations under Syngman Rhee was an unsuccessful approach in that it failed 
to ensure such violations were not repeated. It served to further weaken the 
government and led to its rapid overthrow by Park Chung-hee. Furthermore, 
the Chang government’s response to human rights violations was limited to 
the purge of lower-level officials—no action was taken against Rhee himself. 
 The Sixth Republic government’s response to violations committed 
during the Chun regime, however, was much more effective. Action was limited 
to top officials complicit in human rights abuses. In addition, these trials had 
no role in the outcome of the transition.  Though a significant step on South 
Korea’s part, the trials were an afterthought in the context of the transition.33
Japan
 The division of Korea which brought about the Korean War and led to 
the separate fates of the two nations began with imperial Japan’s exit from the 
28 Ibid., 389.
29 Ibid., 342-403.
30 Ibid., 390.
31 Kuk Cho, “Transitional Justice in Korea: Coping with Past Wrongs after 
Democratization,” Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal 16, no. 3 (2007): 580-611, http://
digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/582/16PacRimLPolyJ57
9.pdf?sequence=1.
32 Cho, “Transitional Justice in Korea.”
33 Ibid.
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Korean Peninsula at the end of World War II. Though Japan and Korea had 
very different roles in early-twentieth century Asia, important parallels with 
imperial Japanese society exist today in North Korea.
 Following Japanese surrender was the American-led Allied Occupation 
of Japan. General Douglas MacArthur, the US occupying force and the 
international community faced the incredible challenge of transforming a 
highly militant society, which worshiped and followed an Emperor, into a 
peaceful democracy, while responding to Japan’s human rights violations.  
MacArthur risked harsh retribution from the Japanese people and occupational 
failure if he pursued judicial action against Emperor Hirohito, but Hirohito had 
overseen numerous grave human rights violations which required attention. 
Though he had not engaged in systematic abuses of domestic human rights 
in the normal sense of the term, he sent millions of Japanese to war with 
unconditional orders to defeat the enemy or die trying.34 Treatment of those 
in territories occupied by the Japanese military, however, was atrocious.35  
 Like Kim Il-sung and his successors, the Japanese Emperor portrayed 
himself as a divine being and elicited absolute obedience from his subjects. 
However, though the Emperor was by far the most powerful man in the Japanese 
government, high-level military officials made many of the operational 
decisions regarding the war36; therefore Emperor Hirohito was not fully to 
blame for many of the human rights abuses conducted by the Japanese military 
(though he did oversee and permit them).
 One of the most striking policy decisions of the American brass was to 
grant Emperor Hirohito amnesty, exempting him from their war crimes tribunal 
which tried, convicted and executed many other Japanese officials following 
the surrender. Hirohito was also retained as Emperor, albeit with very little 
power, to serve as a unifying figure for post-war Japan. However, a purge was 
imposed on many higher-level Japanese government officials, lasting until 
the end of the US occupation.37 Most lower- and mid-level officials were not 
purged.38
 The decision to grant Hirohito amnesty was highly unpopular in America 
and elsewhere. MacArthur, however, emphasized that the decision was made 
in an effort to avoid further antagonizing the Japanese—he feared the citizens 
would rebel openly if the occupying powers moved to put Hirohito on trial.39 
34 Eiji Takemae, Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and its Legacy,  Trans. 
Robert Ricketts (New York: Continuum, 2002), xxviii.
35 Ibid., xxxviii.
36 Ibid., xxxv.
37 Ibid., 268-70.
38 Ibid., 270.
39 Takemae, Inside GHQ, 268-70.
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Rebellion would have possibly led to renewed armed conflict, which nobody 
wanted; moreover, mass opposition, of any sort, to Allied efforts would quickly 
undermine and jeopardize the transition, as well as reconstruction. MacArthur 
and others also recognized the importance of Hirohito’s support and cooperation 
with the transition.40 
 The allied approach, though emphasizing the need for stability and 
support in the objective of transition, was quite different from that of South 
Korea. The head of state was granted amnesty and retained, though with sharply 
limited powers, while many military officials beneath him were sent to war 
crimes tribunals and executed, and other members of the government were 
purged. However, this approach proved incredibly successful—only a few 
years after the war ended, the powers left a completely democratic Japan with 
a new constitution, signed and supported by the Japanese, which renounced 
their ability to make war except in self-defense. The purge was also lifted and 
Japan evolved to become the world economic power it is today, and both its 
democracy and stability remain strongly intact.41 
 It must be noted that the extensive transitional justice approach taken by 
the allies in Japan, involving prosecution of higher- and lower-level officials as 
well as a purge, took place in an exceptional international political environment 
brought on by the conclusion of World War II. Such an approach would be 
virtually impossible to effectively duplicate in North Korea due to the nature 
of the political climate and the resources needed, though individual elements 
of the approach are applicable.
Philippines
 Like Korea and much of Asia, the history of the Philippine nation is 
characterized by  imperialism. First the Spanish, then the Americans and finally 
the Japanese occupied the Philippine islands and following independence 
in 1946, the nation struggled to preserve democracy, which was especially 
weakened by Ferdinand Marcos, who rose to power after independence. 
Following Marcos’ demise in 1986, Filipino leaders experimented with various 
transitional justice approaches in attempts to maintain governmental legitimacy 
while re-establishing democracy.
  While Marcos was technically kept in power democratically, he was 
an authoritarian leader sustained by the military and his own manipulative 
actions.42 The larger political atmosphere in the Philippines which permitted 
Marcos’ abuses was characterized by the all-too-common narrative of military 
40 Ibid., 259.
41 Ibid.,
42 Thompson, Mark R, The Anti-Marcos Struggle (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1995), 70.
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governmental control.43 Following his downfall, civilian leader Corazon 
Aquino took power from the military and attempted to purge leaders involved 
in the Marcos government.44 This had mixed results. As governors and mayors 
fought to keep their positions, critics began casting her actions as non-
democratic, even more so than some of the policies of her predecessor.45 Her 
cabinet, divided between civilian and anti-Marcos military officials, became 
wrought with tension while the government became increasingly unstable. 
 Aquino also limited the power of the military significantly, and soon 
military officials opposed to her policies joined with other military factions, 
including those still loyal to Marcos, in efforts to force her from power. Seven 
coup attempts were carried out against the Aquino government between 1986 
and 1989, though all were unsuccessful. The military factions opposed to 
Aquino were further weakened after the final major coup attempt as leaders 
were arrested.
 Despite this turmoil, Aquino managed to enact some democratic reforms, 
and elections were held in 1992. Fidel Ramos, Aquino’s defense minister, 
was elected and power was peacefully transferred.46 In order to consolidate 
power and continue stabilizing the government, Ramos granted remaining 
rebel military leaders amnesty in exchange for their surrender following his 
electoral victory.47 Due to this policy as well as the arrests of rebel military 
faction leaders under Aquino, the governmental conflict which characterized 
the Aquino presidency abated significantly.
 The transitional period beginning with Marcos’ departure from power 
and ending with the cessation of military hostility toward the government 
included two separate governmental approaches to transitional justice. The 
first was an attempt by Aquino to purge those she suspected of loyalty to 
Marcos from her government; the second was Ramos’ granting of amnesty 
to rebel military faction leaders. In the interest of consolidating her power as 
well as moving the Philippines beyond the Marcos era and the corruption and 
human rights abuses which characterized it, this seemed an acceptable and 
even justified approach. The purge angered those she aimed to remove from 
power, who viewed the action as unfair and unjust. Many Filipinos sided with 
these officials and Aquino’s political challengers, calling the attempted purge 
undemocratic.  These factors resulted in a highly destabilized government and 
several attempted coups. 
43 Ibid., 168.
44 Ibid., 166.
45 Ibid., 167.
46 Ibid., 178.
47 Ibid., 176.
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 Ramos’ approach, conversely, ended the conflict between rebel military 
factions and the government. Many of the problems which plagued Aquino’s 
presidency and government, particularly the instability and frequent attempts 
on the part of the military to force her from power, were eliminated as a result 
of Ramos’ offer of amnesty to remaining military leaders. The Philippines 
consequently saw no attempts to force presidents from power for almost ten 
years.   
 Political instability returned in 2001 when President Joseph Estrada 
was compelled to leave office by popular protests amid widespread belief 
that he was concealing illegal income.  Arbitrary killings and other problems, 
including corruption, continued under subsequent governments.48 The Filipino 
transition cannot be called a success as it failed to restore essential Filipino 
civil liberties. However, many of the abuses carried out by Marcos were 
ended and those loyal to him were not able to exercise any notable influence 
in the Filipino government after 1992. The political power of the military was 
also neutralized significantly under Aquino and Ramos, leading to a stronger 
Filipino democracy. The different approaches taken by Aquino and Ramos 
toward pro-Marcos and rebel military factions in the Philippines, as well as 
the results of these approaches, are therefore illustrative.
Germany
 Like modern Korea, divided Germany was for decades characterized 
by sharp contrast, and a unique set of circumstances, including the absence of 
a domestic authoritarian leader, were addressed during reunification.  
 Set on a Cold War fault line, East and West Germany developed quite 
differently following the surrender of the Third Reich, due, as in Korea, to 
post-war occupational divisions and the rapid fallout between the Western 
allies and the Soviets. Strong executives were not part of the government 
of East Germany, which was, like other eastern European communist states, 
subject to the authority of the Soviet Union. Power in the East German 
government was decentralized, and therefore transition did not bring into 
question the fate of a dictator. The prominent secret police force (commonly 
known as the Stasi), which engaged in monitoring East German citizens and 
arbitrarily imprisoned some, was the institution of main concern in the German 
transition.49 Following reunification was the question of how to approach the 
Stasi leadership as well as the secret files the members had compiled on East 
German citizens. 
48 “Philippines,” Human Rights Watch, accessed July 8, 2012, http://www.hrw.org/asia/-
philippines.
49 Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, 61.
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 While Stasi officials had attempted to destroy the files before a mob 
stormed its headquarters as part of popular democratic and reunification efforts, 
most remained untouched.50 Many debated the proper approach for the German 
government regarding the files; some believed they should be destroyed to 
protect the privacy of their subjects and to help East Germany move past the 
Stasi days, while others believed the subjects had a right to their files, and 
even that files should be used to try Stasi officials. The files were eventually 
made accessible to their subjects. A truth commission was later undertaken 
to investigate the secret police and East German abuses of power and human 
rights violations, which included some public testimony and produced policy 
recommendations for the government.51
 Amnesty was not granted to any parties; however, with few exceptions, 
no East German officials were ever prosecuted for human rights abuses. Though 
the government approach to the Stasi files and truth commission were criticized, 
they were successful in complementing transitional efforts and Germany is 
today a world democratic power which protects the rights of its citizens.52
Romania
 Allied with Germany early in World War II, Romania found itself inside 
the Iron Curtain along with East Germany following its conclusion. Similar to 
North Korea, Romania was a communist state ruled by a repressive dictator 
in the decades following World War II, with a decreasing standard of living, 
the lowest in in its region by 1989. Leader Nikolae Ceausescu was tried and 
executed by civilians as part of transition; they faced legal obstacles in bringing 
lower-level officials to court, which impeded transitional justice efforts, but 
not the transition itself. 
 Ceausescu came to power in 1965 and initially pursued progressive, 
West-looking policies, breaking from the Soviet Union on some issues.53 As 
time passed, he increasingly followed a trajectory similar to that of Ferdinand 
Marcos and Park Chung-hee, widening the scope of the government and 
greatly broadening the powers of the police force, diminishing the rights of the 
Romanian populace and causing his own popularity to fall.54 He also adopted 
debt-reduction measures which were ultimately successful, but impoverished
50 “Stasi Museum,” Stasi Museum, accessed July 8, 2012, http://www.stasimuseum.de.en/
enindex.htm.
51 Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, 53.
52 “Germany,” Human Rights Watch, accessed July 20, 2012, http://www.hrw.org/
europecentral-asia/germany.
53 Ibid.
54 Jan Zielonka and Alex Pravda, ed. Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe, Volume 
I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 213.
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the population considerably.55 Though international organizations classified 
Romania under Ceausescu as a highly repressed society, Ceausescu worked 
to mask the oppression his regime engaged in; as a result, scholars are unsure 
of the extent of his abuses.56
 Unlike the Kim regime in North Korea, however, Ceausescu was 
unable to sustain his rule following the collapse of the Soviet empire and, 
accordingly, the simultaneous evaporation of its military support for his regime. 
The population rose up against Ceausescu in December 1989. Following an 
unsuccessful attempt to flee the capital, Ceausescu was captured, forced to 
stand a farce of a trial for his crimes, and executed.57
 Prior to his departure, Ceausescu issued a proclamation of amnesty 
for most crimes committed before 1988, and limited the punishments for the 
most severe, such as murder.58 This proclamation remains in effect and has 
obstructed retroactive justice. However, between 1993 and 2002 fourteen 
former officials—police officers, militia officers, a political prison chief and 
the Interior Minister were tried and convicted for exceptional crimes under 
prior communist regimes.59
 Romanian democratic transition was largely successful. Pre-World War 
II political parties reappeared, market reforms were quickly instituted and 
long-term economic growth followed. Several democratic transfers of power 
have taken place since Ceausescu’s removal, and the repression of political 
freedoms and human rights abuses common throughout most of Romania’s 
communist history have not returned.60
Czechoslovakia
 Like Romania, Czechoslovakia was an authoritarian communist state 
for over four decades, but it differed from its neighbors in notable ways. 
Following peaceful transition, its new government was faced with the objective 
of ensuring that human rights violations carried out by lower-level officials 
under the previous communist leadership did not re-emerge.
55 Ralph Blumenthal, “Upheaval in the East: Obituary; The Ceausescus: 24 Years of Fierce 
Repression, Isolation and Independence,” New York Times (New York, NY), December 
26, 1989: http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/26/ obituaries/upheaval- east-obituary-
ceausescus-24-years-fierce-repression-isolation.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.
56 Raluca Ursachi and Raluca Grosescu, “Transitional Criminal Justice in Post-Communist 
Romania,” Presentation at the Crimes of the Communist Regimes conference, Prague, 
February 24-26, 2010, http://www.ustrcr.cz/data/
 pdf/konference/zlociny-komunismu/Raluca_Grosescu.pdf.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 “Romania,” Human Rights Watch, accessed July 8, 2012, http://www.hrw.org/
europecentral-asia/romania.
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 Early in its communist history, political repression in Czechoslovakia 
was not as severe as it was elsewhere in Eastern Europe—in the 1960s, 
particularly under Alexander Dubcek, the Czechoslovakian government briefly 
moved away from authoritarianism and toward partial democracy and economic 
decentralization.61 This was halted forcibly by the Soviet Union in 1969; troops 
were sent in to “normalize” Czechoslovakia and reverse the fledgling political 
transformation. Until the Velvet Revolution of 1989, the goal of the occupying 
Soviet Union was to prevent Czechoslovakia from sliding out of the orbit of 
the USSR again.62 Czech leadership after 1969 lacked a strong, independent 
executive—as was the case in East Germany, power was less centralized and 
subject to Soviet authority, as demonstrated by the occupying military.63
 In the midst of the ultimately successful 1989 movement for democracy, 
popularly known as the “Velvet Revolution”, as well as the collapse of other 
communist states and rapid decline of the USSR, Czech leaders decided to 
dismantle the longstanding communist system.64 President Gustav Husak 
appointed non-communist leaders to fill an entirely new government and 
resigned shortly afterward.  Democratic elections were held in 1990, and a 
“lustration law” was passed by the new parliament the following year.65 
 Similar to a purge, the “lustration law” forbade the holding of office in 
governmental, educational, judicial, media or state-owned corporate fields by 
communist collaborators of almost every sort.66 Lower- and mid-level former 
officials, as well as members of the population having demonstrated communist 
sympathy, were targeted by the lustration law. In addition, a narrower resolution 
mandating screening of Federal Assembly employees and officers under the 
Prime Minister was adopted.67 Efforts to exclude communist sympathizers 
from government were quickly established. In 1993 Czechoslovakia divided 
into the Czech Republic and Slovakia following a national referendum for 
Slovakian independence.
Results in the Czech Republic
 The original lustration law was intended to last five years; the Czech 
Republic has renewed it twice and it remains in effect. In addition, other laws 
61 Mahoney, William M,  The History of the Czech Republic and Slovakia (Santa Barbara: 
Greenwood, 2011), 208-11.
62 Ibid., 216-28.
63 Zielonka et al., ed., Democratic Consolidation, Vol. I, 320.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid., 322.
67 Nadya Nedelsky, “Divergent Responses to a Common Past: Transitional Justice in the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia,” Theory and Society 33, no. 1 (2004): 65-115, http://
moduly.outly.cz/posycze1/transitionaljustice.pdf.
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condemning the former communist party as a criminal organization were later 
passed, and several former officials were prosecuted. Presidential amnesties and 
statutes of limitations prevented the prosecution of many lower-level officials; 
trial subjects were high-level officials or those accused of crimes too severe 
to be exempted from trial by amnesty or a statute of limitation.68
 The Czech economy grew following the Velvet Revolution and has 
continued ever since; the Czech Republic is now one of the premier Eastern 
European economic powers.  Its democracy remains strong and communist 
influence has been effectively kept out of the government. Lustration policies 
have also not led to any major social unrest or civil conflict in the Czech 
Republic.69
Results in Slovakia
 Though initially part of Czechoslovakia and under the same lustration 
law, Slovak officials did not enforce it in the same capacity as their Czech 
counterparts prior to independence.70 This approach continued following 
independence, and the lustration law was allowed to expire as originally 
planned in 1996. However, the last chief of the Czechoslovak Secret Service 
was tried in Bratislava and sentenced to a brief prison term in 2001.71 A 
Department for the Documentation of Crimes committed by the communist 
regime was established by Slovak Minister of Justice and former religions 
dissident Jan Carnogursky in 1999. This institution aimed to provide legal 
advice to victims of communist abuse seeking restitution, though it has 
reportedly been slow and inefficient.72
 Despite such deviation from the neighboring Czech Republic’s approach 
to former communist officials, the Slovak economy has experienced similar 
growth, and Slovakia remains a peaceful democracy. Some minor problems 
have been reported with Slovakian human rights, including lengthy detentions 
prior to trial and limits on freedom of religion in some areas, and corruption 
remains a concern.73 However, Slovakia’s transition can be considered 
successful.
Hungary
 Another member of the Soviet bloc, Hungary has little in common with 
North Korea besides communist history, and the forms communism took 
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
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in the two countries were quite different. However, North Korean officials 
have expressed interest in the Hungarian model of economic development.74 
Democratic transition and transitional justice in North Korea following the 
Hungarian model also merit consideration as they may ease transition and 
make it more acceptable to those now in power. 
 Similar to Czechoslovakia and other Soviet satellite states, Hungary 
resisted communist occupation and control. Like Czech prime minister 
Alexander Dubcek, Hungarian prime minister Imre Nagy liberalized Hungarian 
government and policies, though a decade earlier than Dubcek.75 Fearing 
a Hungarian break from the Soviet bloc, Moscow intervened militarily in 
1956, and the dispatched Soviet troops met with heavy, though ultimately 
unsuccessful, civilian resistance. Nagy was executed by the Soviets along 
with hundreds of other Hungarian rebels.  Thousands more were imprisoned 
or interned.76
 In 1989, popular protests against the occupying Soviets met with Soviet 
Premiere Mikhail Gorbachev’s willingness to allow Hungary to transition from 
a communist economy with some free-market characteristics to a full market 
economy amidst a rapid Soviet decline.77 Peaceful, managed democratization 
followed with the approval of Gorbachev as pro-democracy leaders met with 
government officials to bring about transition78, and in 1990 Hungary held its 
first free parliamentary elections in decades, along with many of its neighbors.79 
The Hungarian Democratic Forum, a conservative party, won the elections 
and reform was adopted slowly. The Hungarian Socialist Party, made up of 
former communists, won the 1994 elections; progress in human rights as well 
as economic and democratic liberalization was not hampered by their control.80 
 Following democratization, the Hungarian government was unable to 
prosecute past human rights violators due to the repeated declaration of such 
actions as unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. The Court made most 
of the final decisions on the permissibility of retroactive justice and lustration
 laws, declaring both unconstitutional.81 Though the passage of a law defining
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crimes committed by the Soviets in 1956 as crimes against humanity was 
upheld, only two former officials were ever tried as a result.82 Despite such 
reluctance to pursue judicial action against former communist officials or 
limit their participation in a post-communist society, Hungary’s transition was 
very successful, and post-transitional liberalization has also been successful.83
Tabulating Case Study Data
 Per Grodsky’s method, referenced above, seven general categories will 
be used to label post-transitional government responses to previous abuses, 
beginning with the most lenient approach, cessation and codification of human 
rights violations, and ending with the most harsh, criminal prosecution of those 
highest on the chain-of-command.84 The categories are as follows:
1. Cessation and codification of human rights violations
2. Rebuke of old system
3. Rehabilitation and compensation for victims
4. Creation of a truth commission
5. Purging human rights abusers from public function
6. Criminal prosecution of “executors” (those lower on the chain-of-command)
7. Criminal prosecution of “commanders” (those higher on the 
 chain-of-command)
 The approaches taken in the cases examined above fall into many of 
these categories, and most of the post-transitional governments adopted policies 
which invoked multiple approaches, such as ceasing and codifying violations, 
rebuking the old system, purging human rights abusers from public function 
and prosecuting lower- and higher-level officials, which was the approach 
taken in Japan. Severe approaches (those being classified as five, six or seven 
by Grodsky’s method) are often supplemented by more lenient tactics—for 
example, a new government putting a former dictator on trial may also provide 
rehabilitation and compensation for citizens abused under the dictator’s 
regime. Case studies show this to be helpful and effective; accordingly, those 
participating in North Korean transition should consider using several of the 
lenient approaches to end human rights violations, label such violations as 
wrong and unacceptable, and aid the victims of imprisonment and torture. 
82 Ibid.
83 Zielonka et al., Democratic Consolidation, Vol. II, 291-2, 4-5.
84 Grodsky, The Costs of Justice, 38.
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 However, use of one of the harsher approaches does not necessitate 
use of others—for example, Roh Tae-woo and Chun Doo-hwan, two former 
leaders, were tried and convicted in South Korea for ordering the violent 
repression of a student protest, but, with a handful of exceptions, no action 
was taken against lower-level officials, nor was a purge instated. Rarely are 
both lower- and higher-level officials prosecuted systematically for past human 
rights violations because such an approach carries greater risk of stalling 
transition or destabilizing the new government, in addition to being difficult 
and costly.85 Therefore, post-transitional governments taking category seven 
approaches do not usually take approaches fitting into category five or six, 
though category one through four approaches may be invoked along with the 
more severe action.
 Following is a set of tables. Table 1 contains the values assigned to 
the approaches of the post-transitional governments examined in this essay, 
corresponding to the categories listed above. The value listed represents 
the most severe action taken by the respective government—more lenient 
approaches (those in categories 1-4) may also have been taken in each case. 
As noted in the preceding paragraph, governments often use only one of the 
harsher approaches (those in categories 5-7); multiple values indicate that a 
government used more than one of these approaches. Values of five or six 
represent systematic action against lower-level officials, while trial of just 
one higher-level official (a national leader or one working directly under 
a national leader) qualifies as a category seven response. In addition, the 
outcome (successful or unsuccessful) of each transition is listed. Table 2 lists 
the number of cases in which each approach was used and the number of 
successful resulting outcomes.
Table 1
85     Ibid., 49.
Case S. Korea (1960) S. Korea (Post-'87) Japan Philippines 
(Aquino) 
Approach 5 7 5, 6, 7 5 
Outcome Unsuccessful Successful Successful Unsuccessful 
 
Philippines 
(Ramos) 
Germany Romania Czechoslovakia/ 
Czech Republc 
Slovakia Hungary 
2 4 7 5, 7 3 2 
Unsuccessful Successful Successful Successful Successful Successful 
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Approach Successful Instances 
7 3 of 3 cases 
5, 6, 7 Successful in only case used 
5, 7 Successful in only case used 
5 1 of 3 cases 
4 Successful in only case used 
3 Successful in only case used 
2 1 of 2 cases 
 
Table 2
Analysis of Case Study Data 
 Many of the approaches have led to success; however, the most effective 
option in terms of prior usage and resulting success is approach 7, as outlined 
by Grodsky. Trial, and possibly conviction, of top leaders is an ideal option for 
transitional or post-transitional states for several reasons. First, trial of a leader 
who allowed or encouraged governmental violations of human rights holds 
that leader accountable for such crimes. Second, such a trial sets a national 
precedent for future human rights action, and, similarly, serves as a warning 
to post-transitional leaders that they will, too, be prosecuted if they follow the 
path of their predecessors. Third, such action does not greatly interfere with 
transition; if lower-level officials are not tried along with higher-level officials, 
the state is more likely to remain stable and experience a successful transition. 
This is evidenced by the failed transitions of post-Rhee South Korea and the 
Philippines under Aquino.
 In the interest of protecting human rights and fostering democratization, 
would selective prosecution of higher-level officials be an effective approach 
in North Korea following Korean reunification? If so, which leaders should 
face judicial action, and should amnesty be explicitly granted to others?
North Korean Transition: Objectives and Difficulties
 Within the past few decades, scholars, analysts and politicians alike have 
speculated, on multiple occasions, that collapse of the reclusive Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) was imminent. While 
they were mistaken each time, the DPRK remains weak and reunification under 
the present South Korean government is a possibility. As different as North 
Korea is from South Korea, the leaders and citizens of both share a common 
identity, (pre-Cold War) history and a fundamental desire to see their nation 
reunited. 
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 Given the current state of affairs, such reunification seems most likely 
to come about as a consolidation of the Peninsula under the government in 
Seoul following North Korean collapse, and for the purpose of simplicity, this 
essay assumes such a scenario. Kim Jong-un’s rise to power was a delicately 
managed affair.86 Jong-un had much less time than his father to prepare to 
assume the role, and had not always been Jong-il’s favored successor.87 Clearly, 
the KWP has doubts about Jong-un, and his inexperience may further weaken 
North Korea by perpetuating these doubts and causing power struggles within 
the KWP. 
 Governmental collapse is more plausible with Jong-un in power, and 
it has worked to counter this fact. Top North Korean leaders realize that they 
cannot remain in power without reviving the economy and achieving better 
food security in their country. As a result, Jong-un and Jang Sung-taek, one of 
the other top DPRK officials, have recently met with Chinese leaders to discuss 
further opening North Korea’s market to Chinese investment and developing 
special economic zones to improve the DPRK’s economic situation.88 
Conversely, North Korea continues to threaten its neighbors, attempting to 
appear strong, likely to mask the actual weakness of its government and stave 
off feared international action in response to its human rights situation. North 
Korea’s recent rocket launch89, as well as previous attempts to launch rockets, 
attacks on disputed territories and sinking of the Cheonan in 2010, are examples 
of these attempts.90
 This change would raise many issues, including the question of how 
to approach the government in Pyongyang, its egregious human rights record 
and its suppression of many basic civil liberties.91 While members of the North 
Korean government have committed terrible atrocities and would require 
attention, reunification of such different worlds would be very challenging, and 
a fast, effective transition would be crucial in ensuring successful reunification. 
86 Jean H. Lee, Sam Kim and Foster Klug, Associated Press, “North Korea Rally: Tens of 
Thousands Pledge Loyalty to Kim Jong Un,” Huffington Post (Washington, DC), January 
3, 2012, accessed August 13, 2012, http://
 www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/03/north-korea-rally-kim-jong-un_n_1181595.html.
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88 Kornelius Purba, “China’s Flagging Economic Aid to North Korea,” Jakarta Post 
(Jakarta), August 24, 2012, accessed December 18, 2012, http://www.thejakartapost.com/
news/2012/08/24/china-s-flagging-economic-aid-north-korea.html.
89 “North Korea Defies Warnings in Rocket Launch Success,” BBC News (London), 
December 12, 2012, Accessed December 18, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
asia-20690338.
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Amnesty for some North Korean officials would likely facilitate such a 
transition by raising support for a new government among North Koreans 
and providing for the best administration of the Northern Provinces of the 
new Korea. With such interests in mind, how should South Korea and the 
international community approach the question of amnesty for North Korean 
officials?
 The short-term objectives of South Korea and any nations assisting 
her following reunification will be to transform the area north of the present 
DMZ into an area in which democracy and capitalism are allowed to take 
root and the Seoul government and its institutions are recognized, as well as 
where human rights violations no longer occur. Later, a large-scale overhaul 
of infrastructure as well as continuing (and strengthened) measures to foster 
economic development will be necessary. This segment will examine how 
selective justice and amnesty for North Korean leaders can best be applied in 
the pursuit of these objectives.
Democracy and Capitalism under the Seoul Government 
 Dramatic changes in North Korean society would follow reunification. 
One of the primary objectives of reunification efforts should be to minimize the 
immediate shocks to those living north of the DMZ. North Korean democratic 
institutions should be established relatively soon after reunification, but the 
immediate goal of reunification in this regard should be limited to gaining 
popular recognition of the Seoul government as the one legitimate Korean 
national government. Such an approach would serve to minimize both upheaval 
and unrest in North Korea, which would be counterproductive to the later 
development of democracy and capitalism.
 Support from the North Korean elite, which logically holds favorable 
views of Kim Jong-un and the communist government, will be crucial in 
attaining this objective. While most North Koreans live in extreme poverty, 
the government has given power to some, and many in power have become 
wealthy.92 Reunification under the Seoul government may be welcomed by 
the average North Korean, who fits into the former category, but those within 
the latter would almost certainly react negatively to such change, fearing loss 
of their power (limited as it may be) and wealth, as well as judicial action.
 Past democratic transitions have shown that, as much as possible, new 
governments must avoid provoking the elite into resisting governmental
 
92 Ezra Klein, “The Dark Legacy of North Korea’s Ruling Elite,” Japan Times (Tokyo), 
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change, as such a reaction can cripple or prevent transition.93 Similarly, amnesty 
for political elites helps them to be more receptive to such change as they 
will not fear prosecution for any past crimes or cooperation with the former 
government. This was shown to be the case in the Philippines, as Ramos’ 
offer of amnesty quelled the fierce opposition of military leaders to the new 
government there. Given the presence of an elite in North Korea, amnesty 
should be considered as a policy option to facilitate recognition of the Seoul 
government in North Korea.
Human Rights
 The North Korean government commits grave human rights violations 
in efforts to maintain its power and large scope, and those will need to be 
halted following transition. Among other abuses, the North Korean government 
maintains prison camps for those it determines to be criminals or “anti-
socialists.”94 International estimates believe 200,000 state-declared criminals 
to be detained in these camps, in which conditions are terrible, torture is 
commonplace and deaths are frequent.95 Following reunification, the ROK 
should immediately stop the torture of prisoners and aid them. Liberation 
should follow soon after. In addition, other state abuses of power will need to 
be halted as soon as possible.
 One great challenge post-transitional governments face is ensuring that 
the human rights abuses committed under previous leadership are not repeated. 
While North Korea is a third-world society with a long history of human rights 
abuses, the transition from Pyongyang governance to Seoul leadership would 
quickly result in substantial improvement in North Korean human rights as 
South Korea has maintained a good record following Roh Tae-woo’s electoral 
defeat in 1992.96 A successful transition would likely prevent any future major 
or systematic human rights violations in North Korea as South Korean human 
rights standards would be automatically imposed on the North.
 In addition to trial of higher-level officials, should South Korea take other 
action to aid transition from DPRK governance and human rights violations? 
Government reparations to victims and official apologies for past human rights 
infractions would be helpful. Inquiries into abuses would also be welcome, 
though perhaps after a successful transition has been completed.  Trials and 
punishment for lower-level North Korean officials, however, could undermine 
the transition by taking resources and public attention from it, while 
93 Grodsky, The Costs of Justice, 53-6.
94 “North Korea.”
95 Ibid.
96 Cumings, Korea’s Place, 391.
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risking retribution from the North Korean elite and alienating other North 
Koreans. Furthermore, while many North Koreans likely do not believe much 
of what their current government tells them, they may be wary of international 
influence, particularly from Japan and the US, in human rights trials.97 The 
prominence of anti-imperialist, American and Japanese themes in North Korean 
“Juche” ideology, as well as the level of exposure of North Koreans to these 
themes, suggest such a possibility.98
Post-Transitional Long-Term Development
 History, including that of Korea, shows that one of the major problems 
with governmental transition, particularly transition with international forces 
at play (colonialism, post-colonialism and sometimes unification), is the issue 
of national and local administration.99 One of the impediments for Syngman 
Rhee in post-World War II South Korea was the presence of former Japanese 
collaborators in his administration.100 This was a cause for Southern dislike 
and Northern distrust of Rhee. Though Rhee had spent decades condemning 
Japanese colonial rule of the Korean peninsula, he had little choice but to keep 
Japanese collaborators in his government following independence because of 
their governmental experience and expertise101, though shared anti-communist 
views also played a major role.  American Major General John Hodges 
advocated the same approach following Japanese surrender, believing that, in 
the interest of stability, the US and South Korea had no choice but to keep the 
collaborators in power.102
 Today, those outside North Korea have limited knowledge of what goes 
on inside due to the nature and regulations of its regime. Many conclusions 
can be made on matters regarding the economy and human rights, but little 
is known about its infrastructure and technical policies. Logically, those best 
suited to manage such North Korean affairs, particularly in low, technical levels 
of government, are those presently in those positions, as their knowledge and 
experience in those positions are unrivaled. A wide cleaning of the lower- 
and mid- levels of the house, so to speak, would hamper transition efforts by 
necessitating training and familiarization of new,  less experienced officials 
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in these matters. Though many lower-level officials engage in human rights 
violations, their actions are likely conducted under considerable pressure 
from the North Korean leadership. Most North Korean civilians suspected of 
anti-socialist activity are imprisoned, often along with the three proceeding 
generations of their families.103 Refusal by an official to carry out senior orders 
probably risks similar, or worse, punishment. Therefore, they are not as culpable 
in systematic human rights abuses and amnesty should be considered.
 Those now in technical administrative positions likely hold somewhat 
more positive views of the Kim regime than the average North Korean, but 
their removal from government may anger them and foster their resistance 
to transition. Furthermore, North Korean officials are at least somewhat 
open to new governing methods. Though they have been commanded by the 
Kim family or their subordinates, many (including the Kims) have studied 
and support other, more successful models for development, including the 
Hungarian model, as noted above.104 Amnesty and retention of mid- and 
lower-level administrative officials is likely to result in their cooperation and 
thereby smooth transition, while institution of an entirely new administration 
will, at least initially, hamper such efforts.
Popular Sentiment and the Question of Amnesty
 It is very difficult to draw definitive conclusions about popular political 
sentiment in North Korea due to the tightly-closed nature of the country and the 
domestic measures in place which do not allow free speech. Given the volume 
and experiences of North Korean defectors, a consensus exists in scholarship 
that, despite the efforts of the government and the spectacles of support for the 
Kim family performed by North Koreans, many do not hold favorable views 
of their leaders.105 
 However, this is not true of all defectors. Some, though frustrated enough 
with life in the North to escape, are trapped in a pro-Kim mindset due to the 
level of political indoctrination which takes place beyond the DMZ.106 There 
may well be considerable factions of North Koreans who staunchly support 
Kim Jong-un and would object, possibly violently, to judicial action against 
him. Grodsky writes that, 
 Even the world’s most brutal dictators seem capable of 
inspiring immense emotional solidarity in their former 
103 N.C. Heiken, Kimjongilia, Documentary (2009).
104 Martin, Under the Loving Care, 667.
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subjects. The powerful reaction to Joseph Stalin’s death, with 
his funeral drawing tens of thousands of mourners, illustrates 
this fact. Fifty years afterward, a retiree who attended Stalin’s 
funeral recalled, ‘It was as if we lost the father of the family, 
the person who took care of us. We felt like orphans.’107
 This anecdote parallels eerily with Kim Il-sung’s and, more recently, 
Jong-il’s funerals.
 Despite the support for Kim encouraged (and required) by the North 
Korean government, some scholars wonder if the Kim family really holds 
complete power.108 It is well-known that the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) has 
a considerable role in the governing process, and advisers of the Kim leaders 
have, of course, been prominent KWP members. Two of these officials, Jang 
Sung-taek and Kim Kyong-hui, have held positions of great power in the Kim 
governments, particularly since Jong-un assumed command in late 2011 due to 
his inexperience.109 High-ranking members of the KWP and relatives of Jong-
il and Jong-un, Jang and Kim have exerted considerable influence in North 
Korea for decades.110 The extent of such influence is impossible to determine 
given the nature of the North Korean government, but with their positions, the 
two may be responsible for many of the Kim government’s policies, including 
those which arbitrarily arrest and imprison North Koreans.
Issues with the North Korean Judiciary
 Compounding the issue of transitional justice in North Korea is the 
nature of the longstanding judicial system. Its views of legal transgressions 
and appropriate justice for such transgressions are quite misguided as it acts 
as a vehicle for the enforcement of decrees of the Kim family and KWP.111 
Severe prosecution of acts labeled treasonous seems to be the main focus of the 
judicial system, and as the Kim family has great influence on the appointment 
of jurors, it can be assumed that they are loyal to the Kim family. 
 The absence of a judicial system capable of conducting trials for past 
human rights violators, whether due to lack of resources or of fair jurors, 
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109 Mure Dickie, “Chef Offers New Tidbit on North Korean Leader,” Financial Times 
(London), December 7, 2012, Accessed December 10, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.
com/world/asia_pacific/chef-offers-new-tidbit-on-n-korean-leader/2012/12/06/77040f42-
3fce-11e2-a2d9-822f58ac9fd5_story.html. The likely role of Jang (spelled ‘Chang’) is 
highlighted.
110 Lerner, in discussion with the author.
111 “World Report 2012: North Korea,” Human Rights Watch, accessed April 21, 2012, 
http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-2012-north-korea. 
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makes successful domestic trial and conviction of violators very unlikely. On 
the contrary, such domestic trials might reverse transitional efforts, affirming 
violations as legally acceptable by declaring violators innocent and permitting 
them to remain in power.
 International tribunals, the alternative to domestic trials, would be 
without these flaws, and would discourage future human rights violations by 
trying and (likely) punishing offenders; however, such tribunals may also be 
counterproductive to transition efforts. Retrospective inquiries into human 
rights violations by non-domestic judicial bodies with the intent of punishing 
offenders would not only destroy any support among the elite for transition, 
as noted above, but would also risk alienating popular support.112 As shocks 
to North Korean society should be minimized in the wake of reunification, 
the early imposition of international jurors and judicial systems on transitional 
North Korea should be avoided as it would be unwelcome and serve to further 
complicate a difficult undertaking. 
Case Studies Most Similar to North Korea 
 Correct application of past transitional justice approaches in North Korea 
requires anticipation of key factors in North Korean transition, and special 
consideration of cases where these factors have been most prominent. On the 
basis of pre-transitional conditions, South Korea is the most similar to North 
Korea. Shared peninsular history, noted above, should be a significant factor 
in consideration of post-unification policy options.  
 The cases of North Korea and Japan are less similar, but a vital aspect 
of North Korean society was also present in World War II-era Japan. As noted 
above, the Kim family is revered on a divine scale by some North Koreans, 
as Emperor Hirohito was before Japan’s surrender. This must be kept in mind 
when addressing the question of amnesty for North Korean officials. The 
incredible success of the decision to grant Emperor Hirohito amnesty merits 
possible inclusion in any proposed solution.
 In addition, pre-transitional Romania bears significant similarities to 
North Korea. Both were communist societies farther distanced from Soviet 
control than some of their counterparts (such as Czechoslovakia), and both 
were ruled by dictators who engaged in systematic human rights abuses, 
including the use of prison camps (though the North Korean camps are much 
more notorious).
Cases Less Similar to North Korea
 While the subject states of each of the case studies were chosen for 
their similarities with North Korea, naturally, some are more similar to North 
112 Grodsky, The Costs of Justice, 19-28.
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Korea than others. This applies particularly to many of the Eastern European 
post-communist states examined above as they are rooted in European and 
Western Asian, rather than East Asian, tradition and often were under subtly, 
but notably, different forms of government than North Korea.
 Czechoslovakia and Hungary differed from North Korea in many 
respects, most importantly in the nature of their relationships with the Soviet 
Union. Both were much more adverse to communist ideas. Government 
officials and civilians alike resisted many such ideas and Soviet directives. 
Such resistance resulted in much greater and more direct Soviet control of 
both. Unlike in North Korea or Romania, vast numbers of Soviet troops were 
sent into Hungary and Czechoslovakia to curtail popular anti-communist 
sentiment, which manifest itself in revolt.  In addition, Moscow itself chose 
Czechoslovakian leaders.
 As a result, communist ideas, autocratic governments, violence and 
human rights violations were associated more with international forces than 
with domestic leaders in Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The reactions of the 
Czech and Hungarian peoples to Soviet political and military influence support 
such an argument. This fundamental difference explains the differences in 
Czech, Slovak and Hungarian transitional justice approaches from those of 
Romania, Japan and post-1987 South Korea. Those ultimately responsible for 
human rights violations were not national politicians but rather policymakers 
in the Kremlin. Therefore following democratization it was logical to take 
action against seemingly traitorous, lower-level domestic collaborators rather 
than attempt to prosecute former officials in Moscow (which would not have 
been feasible anyway).
Authoritarian Leaders and Transitional Justice 
 The prominent common element in pre-transitional societies most 
similar to North Korea has been the presence of a domestically-based 
authoritarian leader. Such leaders were present in each of the cases categorized 
“most similar to North Korea” above, as well as in the Philippines.
 Following are two tables, tables 3 and 4, which contain data extrapolated 
from tables 1 and 2 corresponding to countries with strong, domestically-based 
dictators prior to transition. This is a crucial factor in North Korea today; 
therefore, these cases merit separate consideration.
Table 3
Case S. Korea (1960) S. Korea (Post-'87) Japan 
Approach 5 7 5, 6, 7 
Outcome Unsuccessful Successful Successful 
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Table 4
 
 According to the case studies, approach 7 is the most effective in 
facilitating transition. In societies with strong dictators prior to transition, 
like North Korea, this is particularly the case—trial of commanders has been 
necessary for successful transition in each of the most applicable cases (South 
Korea, Japan and Romania). Therefore, the best approach for Korea and the 
international community in the event of peninsular reunification would be to 
place former top North Korean officials on trial and grant amnesty to lower-
level officials in its government. 
 
Further Considerations 
 No society in the modern world has had a populace exposed to the 
amount of political indoctrination and brainwashing that the North Koreans 
have experienced.113 Furthermore, the leaders in North Korea have been in 
power longer than those in almost any other state, and its remarkable isolation 
has facilitated these realities, making comparison to other cases difficult. 
The experience of Japan and the approach taken there, though of different 
circumstances and a different historical period, require attention due to the 
similarities between the nature of the Emperor’s command before and during 
World War II and that of the Kim family since.
 An ideal general approach (judicial action against higher-level North 
Korean officials) also requires effective implementation. Trials can take any of 
three broad forms: by civilians, national judicial officials, or an international 
tribunal. Combinations of elements of each have been used in other cases: 
the jury is sometimes composed of national, as well as international, 
representatives.
 The nature of the leadership of Kim Jong-un and his predecessors would
113 Lerner, discussion with the author.
Philippines (Aquino) Philippines (Ramos) Romania 
5 2 7 
Unsuccessful Unsuccessful Successful 
 
Approach Successful Instances 
7 2 of 2 cases 
5, 6, 7 Successful in only case used 
5 0 of 2 cases 
2 Unsuccessful in only case used 
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likely make trial by international tribunal difficult. One alternative, trying of 
officials by a jury composed of both domestic and international officials, has 
been problematic in many countries, notably Cambodia.114 As a result of the 
nature of North Korean society under Kim’s rule, international influence in a 
transition should be kept to a minimum in order to maintain public support. 
Therefore, only domestic factions should try higher-level North Korean 
officials.
 The problems noted above will, however, make effective trial of 
higher-level officials by the North Korean judiciary impossible. Without any 
knowledge of international human rights standards or personal experience with 
North Korean prison camps, domestic judicial officials will have a skewed view 
of North Korean officials. Their close political relationships to Kim Jong-un 
and members of the KWP will render them incapable of bringing justice to 
the officials.
Conclusions
 Historical analysis, particularly of cases most similar to North Korea, 
suggests trial of higher-level officials by North Korean civilians would be 
the most effective approach in halting human rights violations and instituting 
democracy north of the present DMZ through recognition of the government. 
In order to hold North Korean officials accountable for their human rights 
violations and end such abuses on the Korean Peninsula while pursuing a 
successful transition, Jang Sung-taek and Kim Kyong-hui, the high-ranking 
members of the KWP presumed by some to be controlling North Korea from 
behind the scenes, should face trial for their crimes. Amnesty for Kim Jong-
un, possibly in exchange for his support of transition, should be considered 
due to the place of his family in North Korean culture. He is also not fully 
responsible for the transgressions committed since the death of his father, as 
he may not hold as much power as Jang Sung-taek, Kim Kyong-hui and other 
KWP officials, though they have called for North Korea to rally around him.115 
  The ROK government should be the only one involved in dictating 
transitional justice in North Korea. Involvement of other nations (particularly 
the US) in the process would be counterproductive due to widespread North 
Korean sentiment. The interests of other nations may also negatively affect 
transitional justice proceedings, as some would be wary of the establishment 
of international legal precedents that could one day affect them. Furthermore, 
other characteristics of international tribunals, particularly the possibility of 
more widespread prosecution of officials, as well as harsher consequences for 
those determined guilty, would be disadvantageous in the case of North Korea.
114 Elisa Hoven, “The Khmer Rouge Tribunal.”
115 Ibid.
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 Accordingly, Jang Sung-taek and Kim Kyong-hui should be tried by a 
court of North Korean citizens, who experienced life under the former regime 
and are unaffiliated with the former judiciary, possibly a few years after 
transition. Like the trials of Roh Tae-woo and Chun Doo-hwan in South Korea, 
such action will allow national focus to stay on transition. Furthermore, it will 
give North Koreans time to become accustomed to democratic society and 
familiar with international human rights standards and laws. This will enable 
a more effective trial of Jang Sung-taek and Kim Kyong-hui. Laws defining 
and forbidding future abuses would complement transitional justice. When 
feasible, reparations for victims and eventually a truth commission should be 
considered to help North Korea move beyond its repressive history. These have 
been shown to contribute positively to other post-transitional societies.116
 Preservation of a national unifying figure, like the emperor in Japan, 
should be considered to facilitate popular support for unification under Seoul 
leadership, which will be necessary for a successful transition. The most 
obvious choice is Kim Il-sung, the “eternal president” of North Korea. Though 
revered by many North Koreans, on a level unmatched by his son or grandson, 
Kim Il-sung would, of course, be unable to exert counter-progressive influence 
on a new Korea. Maintaining Kim Il-sung’s prominence in North Korea, even to 
a lesser degree, would also show international respect for North Korean society 
and its eternal president, which North Korea has long desired.117 Retention 
of Kim Jong-un should also be an option, though he should be given as little 
power as possible.
 In the interest of successful transition, blanket amnesty should be 
granted to lower-level North Korean officials, and they should be retained in 
their positions. Case studies support this approach, even in Hungary where 
former communists regained national control. The necessarily limited nature 
of international influence following transition also makes amnesty for lower-
level officials ideal.
 The case of North Korea is unique and complex, and any transitional 
justice approach to human rights violations by North Korean leaders must take 
into account and reflect such complexity. Though North Korea is like no other 
society in history, prosecution of higher-level officials has been successful in 
other unique societies. One can only hope that someday the lessons learned 
from successful application of transitional justice in North Korea will aid 
transitional efforts elsewhere in the world.
116 Hayner, Unspeakable Truths.
117 Barry Keenan (Denison University Professor), in discussion with the author, June 7, 
2012.
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